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The Impact of Cash Flows and Accruals on Belief Asymmetry 
We examine the market-relevance of disaggregating earnings into cash flow and accrual 
components. Unlike the majority of capital markets accounting research to-date, which has 
restricted analysis to price effects (returns), we focus on belief asymmetry as our measure of 
market-relevance. Specifically we examine the effect, which the earnings component 
disclosure has on the level of belief asymmetry in the market. Our measure of belief 
asymmetry is based on the model developed by Kim and Verrecchia (1991).  Cross-sectional 
ordinary least square regression models are used to analyse the market response to measures 
of cash flow and accrual surprise.   
Using belief asymmetry resolution as our measure of market relevance, we find that (i) the 
cash flow component of earnings has information content for investors, and that (ii) earnings 
decomposed into cash flows and accruals provides incremental information content (in terms 
of belief asymmetry) over disclosure of an aggregate earnings number alone.  
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1. Introduction 
We investigate how the disclosure of cash flow and accrual components of earnings affects 
belief asymmetry among investors. Our paper is, in part, motivated by the model developed 
by Kim and Verrecchia (1991) who articulate a belief asymmetry measure of market response 
to announced information. In this model the trading volume reaction to an earnings 
announcement is a function of both the magnitude of the price reaction and the level of pre-
announcement belief asymmetry. They argue (p.313) that “… the use of volume and returns 
together could potentially generate insights about the multiple, which depends on traders risk 
attitudes and the degree of differential precision among them. … This line of thinking also 
offers an alternative way to understand differences in volumes relative to returns”. 
We start by examining the volume responses to accounting information. Based on the 
theoretical relation between belief asymmetry on the one hand, and price and volume on the 
other, we then use several measures of belief asymmetry to assess the market effect of the 
earnings components. 
The approach we adopt, of using a belief asymmetry measure which combines the price and 
volume reactions to earnings announcements, adds to the existing body of literature on the 
information content of accounting data since previous studies, with limited exceptions, have 
primarily focused on price (return) measures alone. 
Analysing market response in this way may help to explain how and to what extent investors 
use accounting information. Earnings and earnings components information have been shown 
(by price response studies) to have information content for the market as an aggregate; 
however as Kim and Verrecchia argue, such information may be used differentially by 
individual investors.  Accordingly, the absence of a price response to new information does 
not imply that the new information is not of importance to market participants in their 
economic decision-making.   
A large change in share price may be caused by the trading of a subset of sophisticated 
investors who draw on information that is largely ignored by or not available to the rest of the 
market. Conversely, new earnings information may lead a large number of investors to revise 
their valuations without significantly altering the share price. Our belief asymmetry measure 
distinguishes these scenarios, not captured by traditional information content studies.  
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Consequently, we are able to offer broader insights into the market reaction to specific 
accounting information. 
We hypothesise that the disclosure of earnings components such as cash flows and accruals 
can affect the level of belief asymmetry across all traders and potential traders. In contrast, the 
typical price/returns analysis only captures the first moment of the belief distribution; the 
overall market level of belief asymmetry may thus change (even though price may not). 
Support of this hypothesis has policy implications insofar as it captures more of the effects of 
new information.  Rather than just the effect on – potentially sophisticated – price-setting 
investors, we also capture the extent to which investors change their shareholdings, including 
those – potentially unsophisticated investors – who do so through trades which may not affect 
price. 
We also hypothesise that disclosed cash flow is more meaningful to investors than disclosed 
accruals, i.e. that cash flows have more information content relative to accruals. Given that 
cash is generally easier to interpret than accruals, cash flow information should affect 
individual investors’ expectations more than accruals information and thus have a greater 
impact on the level of belief asymmetry in the market. 
We use a sample of 1,244 firm-year observations drawn from NYSE and AMEX; we first 
compare means of price and volume reactions across different levels of cash and accruals 
surprise, before undertaking a cross-sectional regression analysis. The significance of cash 
flow and accrual disclosure is tested by regressing both volume and change in belief 
asymmetry against earnings surprise component variables (as well as a number of control 
variables). Market response, in terms of change in belief asymmetry, is measured over a short 
three- and seven-day event window surrounding the announcement date, while investors’ 
expectations are estimated using both an analysts’ forecasts model and a naïve expectations 
model. 
Our results suggest that cash flows and accruals are associated with a change in the level of 
belief asymmetry, but that it takes several days for the effect to transpire. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, we find that cash flow information is positively related to the change in belief 
asymmetry and affects it more strongly than accruals information. Furthermore, it appears that 
different subsets of investors respond differently to the same set of information. For example, 
sophisticated investors’ shareholdings (and hence trading volume) seem to be less affected by 
 5 
an earnings announcement than relatively “naïve” or inexperienced investors as they have 
wider access to pre-disclosure information. 
In this paper, we contribute to existing literature by introducing belief asymmetry resolution 
as a new measure of market response to accounting information. In looking at the role of 
accounting in changing belief asymmetry we consider, in particular, the relative roles of cash 
and accruals. Finally, by sourcing both forecast and actual accounting data from the same 
database, we avoid the problems relating to different and mutually inconsistent data 
adjustments identified by Givolvy et al (2008). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature and 
formally states our hypotheses. Our method and sample selection are discussed in section 3. 
Descriptives and results are described in section 4.  We offer concluding remarks in section 5. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Three branches of literature are particularly relevant to our research: (i) Studies on the 
information content of earnings components traditionally build on the association between the 
informative disclosure and the market’s price reaction. (ii) Volume-based studies use an 
alternative metric for the market response, but focus on the association with aggregate 
earnings (Beaver 1968; Bamber 1986). (iii) The relative price-volume response has mostly 
been examined analytically (Kim and Verrecchia, 1991) with limited empirical evidence 
(Bamber and Cheon, 1995).  
Standard-setters consider earnings components information relevant to users of financial 
reports and thus require the disclosure of cash-based earnings (in the statement of cash flows) 
in addition to accrual-based earnings (in the income statement). Whilst accrual earnings are 
considered to be a more accurate measure of firm performance (Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No. 1) than cash1, they are more likely to be affected by earnings 
management as revenues and expenses may be discretionally allocated across different 
accounting periods (Dechow et al, 1995). Since cash flows provide information on the firm’s 
ability to generate positive future net cash flows (Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards 95, Paragraph 5a), they can be used to assess the quality of earnings (Schipper and 
Vincent, 2003). A rising private interest in the cash component of earnings is evidenced by a 
recent increase in financial analysts disseminating not only earnings, but also cash flow 
                                                
1 Cash transactions are prone to timing and matching problems that are resolved by accrual accounting (Dechow 
1994) 
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forecasts. Between 1993 and 2005 the proportion of US firms for which both types of 
forecasts were issued increased from just 2.5% to more than 50% (Givoly et al, 2008). 
Prior research finds that accruals and cash flows are individually significant in explaining 
market response in terms of returns (Rayburn, 1986; Ali, 1994; Defond and Hung, 2003; 
Givoly, 2008), however studies on the relative market evaluation of these components provide 
mixed results. Wilson (1987) shows that accruals have incremental information content 
beyond the information contained in cash flows, but Bernard and Stober (1989) find that 
Wilson’s results, which are based on two years of (US) data, are not generalisable. They 
conclude that there is no evidence that earnings components have differential information 
content. In contrast, Bowen et al (1987) and Garrod and Hadi (1998) report that cash flows 
are relatively more informative to investors than accruals. Further evidence also indicates that 
the cash and accrual components of earnings provide different signals to investors and that 
accruals are mis-priced by the market (Sloan, 1996).2 
These studies exclusively draw on the earnings-return relationship to assess the usefulness of 
earnings component information, however, empirical evidence that differences exist between 
the price reaction and the trading volume reaction to an earnings announcement may warrant 
the re-examination of this issue with regards to volume response. Turning to the second group 
of studies, Morse (1981) shows that whilst most of the price reaction and the volume reaction 
occur on the day before and the day of an (quarterly) earnings announcement, the volume 
reaction seems to persist longer than price reaction. The lagged adjustment of trading volume 
versus the almost instantaneous incorporation of information could indicate that there may be 
different factors influencing price reaction and volume reaction. Furthermore, Bamber and 
Cheon (1995) find that despite the magnitudes of price reaction and trading volume reaction 
being positively related on average, there are a significant number of differential price and 
volume reactions to earnings announcements. They conclude that the relationship may be 
closer to independence than to a strong positive association as up to a quarter of earnings 
announcements are shown to lead to either very high trading but little price change or large 
price change but little trading.  
In contrast to the earnings-return relation, there exists no generally accepted theory as to what 
exactly drives volume response. Share trading may arise from a number of factors that affect 
individual investors such as changes in beliefs based on information, changes in share price, 
changes in risk preferences, changes in liquidity requirements, changes in taxation, changes in 
                                                
2 Xie (2001) finds that the mis-pricing of accruals is largely due to abnormal accruals. 
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consumption opportunities, changes in wealth, etc. (Morse, 1980; Ziebart, 1990). Beaver 
(1968) proposes an intuitive relation between the price response and the volume response to 
an earnings announcement, which can then be used to develop a framework for interpreting 
trading volume reaction. In his view, the trading volume reaction to an earnings 
announcement represents the sum of all individual investors’ trades. In contrast, the price 
reaction is regarded as the change in the market’s average expectations following the 
informative disclosure. Therefore, the two measures differ as volume response preserves the 
differences in beliefs among individual investors, whereas these differences are cancelled out 
in the price response, as this measure only considers average beliefs (Atiase and Bamber, 
1994). 
Kim and Verrecchia (1991) provide a formal analytical framework to Beaver’s intuition, by 
relating the trading volume reaction of an earnings announcement to the belief structure in the 
market. They argue that differences in the individual investors’ pre-disclosure expectations, 
(i.e. the pre-disclosure belief asymmetry) arise as private information of varying precision is 
unevenly distributed in the market prior to the earnings announcement. Thus, an investor, who 
has access to high-quality pre-disclosure private information and has confidence in its 
precision, will be less surprised by the earnings announcement and consequently trade little or 
not at all as his shareholdings already reflect the private information. On the other hand, an 
investor, who has no private pre-disclosure information or relies on low-quality private 
information, will reassess his shareholdings upon the earnings announcement to incorporate 
the newly available public information. Atiase and Bamber (1994) provide empirical evidence 
supporting this proposition by showing that the volume response to earnings announcements 
is an increasing function of both the magnitude of the associated price reaction3 and the level 
of pre-disclosure belief asymmetry. 
Following these findings, we extend the test of the conventional earnings-return relationship 
to test the association between the disclosure of earnings components information and the 
market’s volume reaction. Adopting a model similar to Rayburn (1986), abnormal trading 
volume is substituted for abnormal return and regressed against the unexpected portion of the 
earnings components: 
(1) ∆Vit = β0 + β1 UCPSit + β2 UACit + βi Controls + εi 
                                                
3 Price reaction and trading volume reaction to an earnings announcement have been found to be positively 
correlated, e.g. actively traded shares are associated with a price increase (Lamont and Frazzini 2008). 
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where ∆Vit is the abnormal trading volume, UCPSit and UACit represent the unexpected 
portions of the firm’s reported cash flows and accruals respectively, and Controls are various 
control variables.  
As standard-setters claim that the statement of cash flows provides information to investors 
that may be relevant to investment decisions, and at the same time stress the objective of 
accrual accounting is to make earnings more meaningful, we expect that the decomposition of 
earnings adds to the informative value of earnings. Both cash flows and accruals are expected 
to be individually significant with respect to abnormal trading volume and provide 
information beyond that contained in earnings: 
H1: β1 ≠ 0  
H2: β2 ≠ 0 
Prior research indicates that investors place relatively more importance on cash flow 
information than on accruals information (Sloan, 1996). Given that cash flow information is 
easier to interpret than accrual information, we expect that the disclosure of cash flow 
information affects investors’ beliefs relatively more than accruals. In this case cash surprise 
should have a greater impact on trading volume than accrual surprise. 
H3: β1 > β2 
The third branch of literature we address focuses on belief asymmetry among investors. 
Conventionally information asymmetry is proxied by the bid-ask spread. However, a 
fundamental problem of this measure, as suggested by current finance literature, is that it is 
only one of the costs faced by a dealer and that the other components would have to be 
assumed to be either nil or constant across firms and time4. 
Based on Kim and Verrecchia’s (1991) theoretical trading volume proposition it is possible to 
use an alternative measure of belief asymmetry. If the difference between price and volume 
reaction is explained by the change in belief asymmetry, then the relative price-volume 
response to an earnings announcement should capture the change in belief asymmetry.  
(2) ƒ(RETit , ∆Vit) = γ0 + γ1 UCPSit + γ2 UACit + γI Controls + εi 
                                                
4 The quoted bid-ask spread (the difference between the ask price quoted by a dealer and the bid price quoted by 
a dealer at a point in time) covers the three costs faced by a dealer: (i) order processing (transaction) costs; (ii) 
inventory holding costs (the costs of compensating the dealer resulting from a loss of diversification; and (iii) 
“adverse information costs” (Stoll 1989)). 
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where ƒ(RETit , ∆Vit) is the combined price-to-volume response and the remaining variables 
are defined as above. 
As we assume the relative price volume response to be a more direct measure of belief 
asymmetry, the hypothesis stated above in terms of the volume reaction should also, or 
especially, apply to this new response variable.  
Assuming that an increase in the available information set affects belief asymmetry, providing 
information in the statement of cash flows that is otherwise not reported in the balance sheet 
or income statement, the new information should be significantly related to the change in 
belief asymmetry. 
H4: γ1 ≠ 0  
H5: γ2 ≠ 0 
For the same reasons stated in the volume-response discussion in the previous section, cash 
flow information is expected to more strongly affect belief asymmetry than price as more 
investors rely more heavily on an accounting number that they can understand and interpret. 
H6: γ1 > γ2 
3.  Method 
Measurement of Earnings, Accruals and Cash from Operations 
Both earnings (π) and net cash flows from operations (CFO) are explicitly separately 
disclosed in the financial statements. The accruals (ACCR) component can be estimated as 
the change in non-cash current assets less depreciation expense and change in current 
liabilities (excluding short-term debt) and taxes payable, from information provided in the 
balance sheet and the income statement (Sloan, 1996; Houge and Loughran, 2000). 
Alternatively, a measure of accruals can be directly computed as the difference between 
earnings and cash flows from operations. 
Given a firm’s earnings can be decomposed into its cash flow and accrual components: 
(3) π = CFO + ACCR; then: 
(4) ACCR = π – CFO 
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Earnings and its components are standardised by the firm’s number of ordinary shares 
outstanding as reported by IBES, so that: 
(5) EPS = CPS + ACS; and  
(6) ACS = EPS – CPS; 
where EPS are earnings per share, CPS are operating cash flows per share, and ACS are 
accruals per share. 
This approach is adopted as it provides a more accurate measure of accruals5. Given that the 
inclusion of statements of cash flows in general purpose financial reports has been mandated 
by the Financial Accounting Standards Board since 1987, cash flow information is available 
for the entire period under observation (from 1997 to 2006)6.   
Measurement of Earnings, Cash flow and Accrual Surprise 
Prior research finds abnormal returns around the annual earnings announcement dates to be 
more closely related to earnings surprise based on an analysts’ forecast model than on a time-
series based model (Fried and Givoly, 1982). In contrast, abnormal trading volume in the 
announcement period appears to be more closely associated with unanticipated earnings 
estimated by a random walk (i.e. naïve expectations) model than by an analysts’ forecasts 
model (Bamber, 1986). These relations may also hold for an earnings component analysis.  
Hence, two measures of unanticipated cash flow and accruals are used – one based on 
analysts’ forecasts and another based on a random walk model.   
Unanticipated cash flows are estimated as the difference between the forecasted cash flows 
per share (CFF) and the cash flows per share actually reported (CFA) scaled by the forecasted 
value. This forecast error will subsequently be referred to as cash flow surprise per share 
(CFS). 
(7) CFSit = CFAit / CFFit – 1  
No forecasts are issued for accruals, but using analysts’ earnings per share forecasts (EF), 
together with CFF, accruals surprise per share (ACS) can be computed using the earnings 
relation stated in equation (4) above. Accruals forecasts (ACF) are implied by the difference 
between earnings forecasts (EF) and cash flow forecasts (CFF), and actual accruals (ACA) are 
                                                
5 Current liabilities and current assets, for example, may include non-ordinary items from the acquisition or 
disposal of subsidiaries, which are not considered as accruals. 
6 ‘Statement of Cash Flows’, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 95, FASB (1987) 
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calculated as the difference between actual earnings (EA) and actual cash flows (ACF). Thus 
the implied accruals surprise (ACS) can be calculated as in equation (6).  
(8) ACSit = ACAit / ACFit – 1 
(9) ACAit = EAit – CFAit 
(10) ACFit = EFit - CFFit 
(11) ACSit = (EAit – CFAit ) / (EFit - CFFit) – 1 
Naïve Expectations Model 
The alternative proxy for the market’s pre-announcement expectations is based on the naïve 
expectations model. Assuming that earnings and cash flows follow a random walk, i.e. that 
they are mean reverting, expectations are proxied by the cash flows per share (CFAt-1) and 
accruals per share (ACAt-1 = EAt-1 – CFAt-1) reported in the previous year, and thus 
unexpected cash flows (∆CF) calculated as follows: 
 (12) ∆CF = CFAt / CFAt-1 – 1 
Similar to the analysts’ forecast model, an implied measure of unexpected accruals will be 
obtained by drawing on the earnings relation: 
(13) ∆AC = ACAt / ACAt-1 – 1 
(14) ACAt-1 = EAt-1 – CFAt-1 
(15) ACAt = EAt – CFAt 
(16) ∆AC = (EAt – CFAt) / (EAt-1 - CFAt-1) – 1 
where ∆AC are unexpected accruals; ACA, EA and CFA are defined as above with time 
subscripts added. 
Measurement of Market Response 
IBES is used as the source of the earnings announcement date.7  Abnormal price response is 
defined as a firm’s unsystematic share returns using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
                                                
7 To ensure that this date refers to the initial earnings announcement, a random sample of 25 firm-years was 
drawn and the announcement date verified by consulting the firm’s media releases published on the firm’s 
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(e.g. Rayburn, 1986). This approach isolates the firm-specific components of returns from 
market systematic returns. The cumulative abnormal return is calculated for three- and seven-
day windows as follows: 
(17) CARiA = RETiA – αi + βi RETMA ; 
where: 
CARiA is firm i's cumulative abnormal return in the three-day (or seven-day) announcement 
period; 
RETiA is firm i's total return in the three-day (or seven-day) announcement period; 
RETMA is the market’s total return in the three-day (or seven-day) announcement period; and 
αi and βi are the firm specific return parameters determined by an estimated market model, 
which regresses a firm’s return against the market return: 
(18) RETiNA = αi + βi RETMNA + εi; 
where: 
RETiNA is firm i's total return in the 250-day non-announcement period ending on day t-28; 
RETMNA is the market’s total return in the 250-day non-announcement period; and 
εi is the firm specific error term. 
Exhibit 1: Forecast and announcement period 
 
The different market response and market reaction variables can now be substituted into 
equation (1). Thus, the regression models for the volume-based analysis are specified as: 
                                                
website, or if unavailable the Form 8-K filings that are filed by the SEC. If neither sources are available 
(footnote) references to the earnings announcement are searched in the Wall Street Journal (through Factiva). 
8 This 250-day estimation window excludes any previous announcements.  
 13 
M1: VOLit = β0 + β1 CFSit + β2 ACSit + controls 
M2: VOLit = β0 + β1 ∆CFit + β2 ∆ACit + controls 
A firm-specific median-adjusted trading volume measure is used (refer Atiase and Bamber, 
1994). Abnormal trading volume (VOL) is defined as the difference between the average 
number of shares traded during the announcement period and the median number of shares 
traded during the non-announcement period, divided by the number of shares outstanding on 
the balance date: 
(19) VOLiA = [ ΣViA / n – md(ViNA) ] / Total Shares * 100; 
where: 
VOLiA is firm i's abnormal daily trading volume during the three-day (or seven-
day) announcement period; 
ΣViA / n is the average number of firm i's shares traded during the three-day (or 
seven-day) announcement period (n is the length of the window); 
md(ViNA) is the median number of firm i's shares traded during the 250-day non-
announcement period ending on day t-2; and 
Total Shares is the number of firm i's ordinary shares outstanding on the balance 
date. 
The average daily trading volume is used for the announcement period as it is more 
representative of the total number of shares traded within that period. In contrast, the level of 
“regular” (pre-announcement) trading volume is measured as the median non-announcement 
period daily trading volume as the median is less affected by unusually high trading volume 
generating events. 
For the belief asymmetry analysis, a measure that combines the price and volume response is 
developed. The measure derived from the Kim and Verrecchia model (1991) as well as an 
alternative measure is used. 
The first measure of absolute belief asymmetry resolution, from the Kim and Verrecchia 
(1991) model is the ratio of the volume response (VOL) to the price (CAR) response, which is 
calculated for three-day and seven-day windows. As their measurement bases are different, 
both variables are standardised by taking the z-scores of their absolute values. 
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(20) VoPiA = zscore(VOLiA) / zscore(CARiA)9 
A VoP measure close to one indicates that the volume response to an earnings announcement 
is proportionate to its price response. However, the magnitudes of the volume reaction and the 
price reaction may vary. If an earnings announcement leads to a stronger (weaker) price 
reaction relative to the volume reaction, the VoP measure will approach zero (infinity). This 
may be interpreted as a small (large) revision in belief asymmetry. 
A potential weakness of this measure is that while it is bounded by zero on one side, it can 
take very large positive values if the price response is sufficiently small. To mitigate this 
effect, the abnormal return variable (CAR) is winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentile10. 
The regression equations are specified as: 
M3: VoPit = β0 + β1 CFSit + β2 ACSit + controls 
M4: VoPit = β0 + β1 ∆CFit + β2 ∆ACit + controls 
Another method used to address the issue of extreme values is to take the difference between 
the standardised volume response and price response variables rather than the ratio: 
(21) VminPiA = zscore(VOLiA) – zscore (CARiA) 
Whilst this proxy for belief asymmetry may not seem as intuitive as the VoP measure, it 
preserves the relative difference between price response and volume response. Thus, VminP 
can be interpreted correspondingly to VoP. VminP will be close to zero if price and volume 
response are similar in magnitude, but negative (positive) if the price reaction is relatively 
stronger (weaker) than the volume reaction. 
The regression analyses are performed on the following equations: 
M5: VminPit = β0 + β1 CFSit + β2 ACSit + controls 
M6: VminPit = β0 + β1 ∆CFit + β2 ∆ACit + controls 
                                                
9 CAR is constructed as an absolute value as it is the magnitude rather than the direction of the price change that 
reflects the importance of information, irrespective of whether it is good or bad news (see Section 4.6). 
10 Various other variables, including the abnormal trading volume (VOL), are winsorised.  
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A slightly different approach to measuring the change in belief asymmetry is to regress the 
abnormal volume response not only on the earnings components, but also on abnormal returns 
and the interaction between the measures of earnings surprise and returns: 
M7: VOLit = β0 + β1 CFSit + β2 ACSit + β3 CARit + β4 CFSit * CARit + β5 ACSit * 
CARit + controls 
M8 : VOLit = β0 + β1 ∆CFit + β2 ∆ACit + β3 CARit + β4 ∆CPSit * CARit + β5 ∆ACit 
* CARit + controls  
These equations are transformations of M1 and M2. Conceptually, the coefficient on CARit 
(β3) represents the average measure of belief asymmetry resolution as it describes the 
market’s volume reaction to the earnings announcement relative to the price reaction. 
Furthermore, the interaction coefficients β4 and β5 indicate how the interaction between return 
and surprise in earnings components affects belief asymmetry. 
Control variables 
Firm size (FSIZE) is used as a proxy for the firm’s pre-announcement information (Bamber, 
1986). It is argued that the larger the firm, the more it is under the public eye, (i.e. the more 
information is available about the firm and the lower is the level of surprise upon the earnings 
announcement). Thus pre-announcement expectations may be more accurate for large firms 
than for small firms, which could weaken the impact of the earnings announcement, as its 
unanticipated portion will be relatively small. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm 
of the firm’s total assets11. 
Leverage is measured by the debt-to-equity ratio. It is used to proxy for the value of the firm’s 
assets relative to its growth opportunities. 
LEVit = Total Liabilities / Total Owners’ Equity 
Analyst following for a given firm (ANAit), is also a proxy for the level of pre-announcement 
information.  The number of analysts that issue forecasts for a given firm is indicative of the 
amount of information circulated about this firm.  ANAit is measured as the number of 
analysts issuing cash flow forecasts for firm i in year t. 
Earnings quality (EQ) describes the extent to which investors can rely on accrual earnings to 
truthfully reflect a firm’s financial performance.  Commonly, earnings quality is proxied by 
                                                
11 Other studies use total market capitalisation to measure firm size. 
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the earnings response coefficient (ERC). As a reliable estimate requires a firm’s annual 
financial data for at least thirty years (i.e. thirty observations), an alternative measure is 
selected12. Defining earnings quality more narrowly as the extent to which accrual earnings 
reflect cash earnings, it is calculated as the ratio of cash flows from operations to net income 
(e.g. Green, 1999). 
EQ = Cash Flows from Operations / Net Income 
Similarly, auditor quality (AQ) proxies for the extent to which investors rely on accounting 
information. Investors may have more confidence if a firm’s accounts are audited by a 
reputable auditor. Thus a dummy variable (AQ) is added for the large accounting firms13:  
AQ = 1 if audited by Big 4 auditor and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, two variables are included to control for the level of pre-announcement belief 
asymmetry, as it may be positively related to the level of belief asymmetry change. These 
variables are included as control variables as the market response is a function of information 
asymmetry in the Kim and Verrecchia (1991) framework. Forecast dispersion (DISP) is 
calculated as the standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts (CF) for a particular firm within 
the forecast period while forecast range (RANGE) is the difference between analysts’ highest 
and lowest forecast for a given firm in the forecast period.  
DISP = st.dev(CF) / med(CF) 
RANGE = [ large(CF) / small (CF) ] / med(CF) 
The forecast period comprises the forty trading days prior to the earnings announcement as 
illustrated in Figure 1.   
Absolute values are used for all variables. Whilst it is possible to form expectations regarding 
the direction of the relationship between earnings components and returns (e.g. high cash flow 
surprise would be expected to be associated with higher abnormal returns), it is the magnitude 
and not the sign of the change in beliefs that is of interest in this study. 
As some variables are ratios of proportions, they may take extreme values and magnify the 
skewness of the distribution as the denominator approaches zero. To mitigate the impact, all 
variables that are calculated as a percentage change are winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentile. 
                                                
12 Actual earnings are obtained from IBES. As this database has only collected data from the 1970 onwards 
(Schipper, 1991), there would not be sufficient data available to compute this variable without substantially 
reducing the size of the sample.  
13 AQ firms refer to the four largest operating auditing firms, which include PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, 
Ernst & Young, and Deloitte & Touche. 
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i.e. the values of the bottom and top one percent observations are substituted by the lowest 
and highest observation within the range. 
Sample  
The sample is drawn from firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX).14 Whilst a number of international firms are listed on the 
NYSE, the sample is restricted to US firms to reduce cross-sectional differences.  
The period under observation is from 1997 to 2006. The first year with cash flow forecasts 
made available on the relevant database is 1993, however a later starting date is chosen as the 
proportion of firms with cash flow forecasts is very low from 1993 to 1996.15 The most recent 
financial year for which all accounting information is available is 2006. 
Share prices and daily trading volume data was obtained from the CRSP database.  The 
relevant data items are summarised in Exhibit 2, Panel A.  Earnings and cash flow forecasts 
together with actual reported earnings and cash flows (per share) are collected from the IBES 
database.16 
As the consensus forecasts computed by IBES may include old and/or revised forecasts, 
individual analysts’ forecasts and their issue dates are obtained from the IBES detail history. 
This allows a consensus forecast to be computed for forecasts issued within a specified time 
window. In contrast, the IBES consensus forecasts include all analysts’ forecasts on file until 
they are revised or withdrawn. Whilst this may comprise a greater number of observations, it 
could also distort the quality of forecasts for firms which have their earnings and cash flows 
less frequently forecasted.  
A firm’s consensus earnings (cash flow) forecast is calculated as the average of analysts’ 
earnings (cash flow) forecasts made with respect to this firm and issued within forty trading 
days prior to the firm’s earnings announcement date.17 This ensures that information from the 
third quarter reports was available and could have been taken into account, while still 
                                                
14 We use U.S. data in this study as cash flow forecasts are available in the IBES database.  
15 Only 2.5% of all firms with earnings forecasts on IBES were also issued with cash flow forecasts in 1993. 
This proportion increases to 14% in 1997, and by 2005 IBES provides cash flow forecasts for more than half of 
the firms with earnings forecasts (Givoly et al, 2008). 
16 Cash flow per share forecasts and actuals are defined as “cash flow from operations, before investing and 
financing activities, divided by the weighted average number of common shares outstanding for the year” 
(Thomson Financial Glossary, 2004). 
17 For comparative purposes, consensus forecasts for twenty and sixty days prior to the announcement date are 
computed as well. 
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providing sufficient data to compute consensus analysts’ forecasts for an adequately sized 
sample. 
Actual earnings and cash flows are obtained from the amounts recorded on the IBES database 
to ensure that both variables have the same measurement basis, which is of importance when 
computing the forecasting error.18 Cash flow forecasts are generally issued on a per share 
basis, but actual cash flow per share are not reported as such in the financial statements19. 
Exhibit 2, Panel B lists the data items obtained from IBES. 
Exhibit 2: Collected data items by source 
This table lists the data items required for the regression analyses and their sources. 
Panel A: CRSP data items  
Closing share price – daily   
Number of shares traded – daily   
Panel B: IBES data items   
Earnings forecasts Cash flow forecasts 
Earnings actuals Cash flow actuals 
No. of analysts issuing earnings forecasts No. of analysts issuing cash flow forecasts 
Earnings announcement date Cash flow announcement date 
Panel C: Compustat  
Total assets Auditor 
Total liabilities GICS sector code 
Total owners' equity GICS industry group code 
Net income GICS industry code 
Net cash flow from operating activities  
Accounting data 
For the control variables, financial report data is retrieved from Standard & Poor’s Compustat 
database [Exhibit 2, Panel C]. These include total assets (Compustat item #4), total liabilities 
(Compustat item #5), auditor (Compustat item #149), net income (Compustat item #172), 
total stockholders’ equity (Compustat item #216), and net cash flow from operating activities 
                                                
18 Cash flows per share as reported in IBES cannot be easily reconciled with cash flows as reported in the 
statement of cash flows without further adjustments. Givoly et al (2008) note that for only five percent of 
observations the actual cash flow number provided by IBES is identical to the one reported on CompuStat. This 
difference is due to the adjustments IBES makes to the reported earnings figure to ensure comparability with the 
estimates (Thomson Financial Glossary, 2006). 
19 FASB Statement 95 Statement of Cash Flows specifically states that cash flows are not to be presented on a 
per share basis. Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K reinforces the prohibition of non-GAAP financial measures in 
materials filed with the SEC, which included the annual reports.  
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(Compustat item 308). Furthermore the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes 
are collected at sector, industry group, and industry level. 
Selection criteria and final sample 
Firms selected have to initially meet the following criteria, which are quantified in Exhibit 3 
in terms of sample size:  
• Firms are issued with at least one one-year ahead earnings forecast with matching 
earnings actual amount between 1997 and 2006; 
• Firms are listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange; 
• Firms are issued with at least one year-ahead cash flow forecast with matching cash 
flow actual amount; 
• Firms’ earnings and cash flows forecasts are issued by at least two different analysts; 
• Firms’ share trading volume on the announcement date is non-zero (e.g. daily trading 
volume data is available). 
The sample for the analysts’ forecasts based model thus comprises 1,244 firm-year 
observations. Whilst it would be preferable to only include firms with cash flow forecasts 
covering the entire period under observation, this criterion would substantially reduce the 
sample, as cash flow forecasts have become prevalent only in recent years. Including all firms 
for which at least one observation can be obtained may introduce survivorship bias; however, 
it enables full exploitation of the available cash flow forecast data. 
For the alternative naïve expectations model, in addition to meeting the criteria listed above, 
earnings and cash flow data from the previous year have to be available. As firms may have 
gone public during the observation period, the sample is further reduced to 809 firm-year 
observations. 
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Exhibit 3: Selection criteria and sample size 
This table summarises the selection criteria and their effect on the sample size. 
All IBES forecasts 65,535 
- with earnings actuals 44,044 
- issued between 1997 - 2006 30,761 
- listed on NYSE or AMEX 13,398 
- with cash flow forecasts & actuals 2,429 
- CFF and EF issued by > 2 analysts 1,419 
- announcement period trading volume > 0 1,244 
 
4. Results and Analysis 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents and discusses the descriptive statistics for the regression variables of the 
models based on analysts’ forecast model and the naïve expectations model. 
As expected, the cash flow surprise variable as proxied by the median analysts’ forecasts 
errors (9%) is smaller than the market surprise based on naïve expectations (20%). The 
distribution is  negatively (left) skewed  with most forecast errors being relatively small. On 
the other hand, surprise based on naïve models is more spread (e.g. standard deviation, inter-
quartile range) than those based on analysts’ forecasts.  
Insert Table 1 here 
Furthermore it appears that accruals are more difficult to predict than cash flows, as the 
implied accrual surprise variables measured using the two models, are significantly higher 
than the equivalent cash flow surprise variables. 
The correlations between these variables are described in Table 2. Several expected 
relationships hold. Absolute return is positively related to trading volume and there are 
positive relations between most of the absolute market surprise variables (based on analysts’ 
forecasts or the naïve expectations model) and the absolute market response variables (return 
and trading volume). 
Insert Table 2 here  
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Comparison of the mean price and volume response 
The expectation that cash and accrual information may have a differential impact on belief 
asymmetry motivates the joint examination of the two components of belief asymmetry. To 
determine whether earnings components have differential information content, i.e. whether 
cash flow and accrual information significantly differently affect market reaction, a 
comparison of means test is undertaken prior to the regression analyses. The pooled sample is 
divided into four groups according to the absolute magnitudes of the surprise measures. Each 
cash flow surprise and accrual surprise observation is ranked as either high or low relative to 
the median value of each measure, and firm-year observations are grouped according to the 
joint cash flow and accrual surprise. The process is repeated for the unexpected cash flow and 
accrual measures calculated using the naïve expectation model. Table 3 provides the results of 
the means comparison. 
Insert Table 3 here 
From the descriptive statistics of the analysts’ forecast model [Table 3, Panel A (i)] it appears 
that more surprise is associated with higher price and higher volume response. Firms with 
relatively low accrual and cash flow surprise experience, on average, an abnormal return of 
3.16% and abnormal trading volume of 41.79% during the three days surrounding the 
announcement date, while firms with relatively high accrual and cash flow surprise have, on 
average, an abnormal return of 4.29% and abnormal trading volume of 60.77%. The mean 
values for abnormal return and trading volume of the mixed response groups (where only one 
the surprise measure is classified as high) also suggest that price response and volume 
response may be higher for firms with high cash flow surprise relative to accrual surprise (∆P: 
4.63% > 3.88%; ∆V: 52.27% > 43.76%). These comparisions suggest that price and volume 
react differentially to cash flow and accrual information. 
To test the significance of these mean differences one-way ANOVAs are undertaken to 
compare the average price response and volume response for these groups. As the dependent 
variables (except for abnormal volume in the naïve model sample) do not have homogenous 
variances (Levene’s statistic < 5; p < .000) and the groups vary in size, the non-parametric 
Tamhane test is used to compare the means of abnormal volume and abnormal return across 
the surprise groups and determine the statistical significance [Table 3, Panel B]. 
Based on the analysts’ forecast surprise measures [Table 3, Panel C (i)], the results indicate 
that a combination of high cash flow surprise and high accrual surprise (“jointly high 
surprise”), on average, leads to higher abnormal return than announcements containing 
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relatively little cash flow and accrual surprise (mean difference = .01125; p < .05). Similarly, 
abnormal trading volume is on average higher for the jointly high surprise group than for the 
jointly low surprise group (mean difference = .1898; p < .05).  
Of greater interest are the two cases with differential cash flow and accrual surprise. The 
mean price response to disclosures with high cash flow and low accruals surprise is 
significantly greater than those with low cash flow and low accruals surprise (mean difference 
= .0146; p < .05). At the same time, the volume response differs significantly between cases 
with jointly high cash flow and accrual surprise and cases with high accruals, but low cash 
flow surprise (mean difference = .1701; p < .05). Given that the level of cash flow surprise is 
the only variable that differs in these cases, the impression that cash flows drive both price 
response and volume response is reinforced. 
The mean comparison tests based on the naïve model’s unexpected change measures produce 
findings which are consistent with respect to price response [Table 3, Panel C (ii)]. Jointly 
high unexpected cash flow and accrual changes are shown to be associated with abnormal 
returns significantly different from those of jointly low unexpected changes (mean difference 
= 0.009; p < .05). Furthermore, significant price response differences exist when the level of 
unexpected cash flows is the only variable that varies in the group (mean difference = .009; p 
< .05). On the other hand, there is no empirical evidence using the naïve model that abnormal 
trading volume reacts differentially to high or low levels of unexpected change (F = 1.730; p 
= n.s.). This could indicate that volume may be mainly driven by investors who follow 
analysts’ recommendations. If analysts’ recommendations are heavily based on cash, as found 
in the previous section, then his would also affect naïve investors. 
Tests of the market’s volume response 
The significance of cash flows and accruals in explaining market response in terms of volume 
is tested individually (H1: β1 ≠ 0 and H2: β2 ≠ 0 respectively) and relative to one another (H3: 
β1 > β2).  
Table 4 presents the results of the regression models with respect to volume-based market 
response. Analyses of the regression models based on analysts’ forecast surprise [M1(a) and 
(b), Panel A] precede those based on the naïve expectation model [M2(a) and (b), Panel B].  
Insert Table 4 here 
Based on the volume response to earnings announcements, it is evident that cash flows have 
information content for investors, supporting H1. Panel A of Table 4 shows that cash flow 
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surprise is significantly positively related to abnormal trading volume (4.500 < t < 4.902; p < 
.01).  
On the other hand, there is no evidence that the disclosure of accruals affects trading volume, 
and H2 is thus rejected. The coefficient is statistically insignificant across both time windows 
(and independent of control variables). A direct test of equality of the coefficients on cash 
flow surprise and accruals surprise reveals that cash flow surprise has a significantly greater 
impact than accruals surprise, thus supporting H3. Investors appear to ignore accruals surprise 
measured with respect to analysts’ forecasts. As the accruals surprise measure used in this 
model is actually an implied measure computed from earnings and cash flow surprise, it may 
be argued that accruals are not specifically disclosed and as such no reaction should be 
expected. However, investors can easily derive this figure provided earnings and cash flow 
information is available. Whether they choose or not choose to do so or whether accruals do 
not play a role in their trading decisions cannot be determined at this stage of the analysis. 
Several other factors explain abnormal volume. The association between abnormal volume 
and cash flow surprise weakens the more information is available about a firm before the 
disclosure, i.e. the more closely it is under public scrutiny. Proxied by firm size, the 
coefficient is negative at the one percent significance level (t = -3.621 for the three-day 
window and t = -5.471 for the seven-day window). 
As another proxy for pre-announcement information availability, increasing analyst following 
lessens the volume response to new cash flow information. This effect is only significant for 
the three-day window (t = -3.067; p < .01) it may be possible that investors using analysts’ 
forecasts react to new information more timely than other investors.  
Audit quality seems to reassure investors in their reliance on accounting information. They 
may be more likely to trade based on information issued by a firm, which is audited by one of 
the AQ than a smaller auditing firm. The coefficient of the AQ dummy is positive at the one 
percent significance level using a three-day trading window (t = 2.385).  
The level of leverage also seems to affect the investors’ trading decision around the earnings 
announcement date. For both the three- and seven-day window, the coefficient is positive 
(2.836 < t < 4.186; p < .01) suggesting that investors are more likely to trade based on new 
information if the firm is highly leveraged. 
The results of the regression analyses based on the naïve expectation model [M2(a) and (b), 
Panel B] largely correspond to the results of the analysts’ forecasts based regressions. Based 
on the coefficients of cash flows and accruals, H1 is accepted and H2 is rejected. Unexpected 
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cash flows are significant and positively related to abnormal trading volume (2.680 < t < 
3.696; p < .01) while unexpected accruals are insignificant across all time windows. As in the 
regressions based on analysts’ forecast surprise, firm size (-4.603 < t < -3.048; p < .01) and 
analyst following (-4.053 < t < -2.666 ; p < .01) are control variables significantly negatively 
associated with abnormal trading volume while audit quality (2.129 < t < 2.553 ; p < .05) and 
leverage (3.210 < t < 4.783 ; p < .01) are significantly positively related. Forecast range and 
dispersion are insignificant in this these models as well. 
As in the price-base analysis, the significance of the cash flow component of earnings and 
insignificance of the accrual component of earnings imply that cash flows are more closely 
associated with the market response (i.e. trading volume in this model) than are accruals. Thus 
H3 is confirmed. 
Tests of change in belief asymmetry 
Volume-to-price response ratio 
The first measure of belief asymmetry is the ratio of abnormal trading volume to abnormal 
return. Results of the related regression analysis are presented in Table 5 Panel A summarises 
the results for tests based on the analysts’ forecasts surprise model and Panel B for those 
based on the naïve expectation model. In neither case are the coefficients of the cash flow or 
accruals surprise variables significant.  
Insert Table 5 here 
This result is contrary to expectations (H4 and H5). However, the lack of significance might be 
due to model specification rather than the hypotheses. As cautioned in section 3, the 
dependent variable is prone to extreme values – as the denominator approaches zero, the 
dependent belief asymmetry variable becomes disproportionately large. The descriptive 
statistics of the regression variables [Table 1] show that the absolute values of the abnormal 
trading volume variable are much more spread than those of the abnormal return variable. 
Over the three-day announcement window, half the observations have an absolute cumulative 
abnormal return between 1.249 and 5.003 percent compared to a volume response between 
9.003 and 73.971 percent. This effect may not have been sufficiently controlled for even 
though outliers were winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentile. 
Volume-price response difference 
To avoid the extreme values caused by low price response, we use an alternative model based 
on the difference between the standardised abnormal trading volume and standardised 
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abnormal return. Whilst a ratio may be a more intuitive measure, the difference measure also 
captures a measure of the relative magnitude of volume response and price response. Table 6 
summarises the results of the regression analyses based on this model for both a 3-day and a 
7-day window. Results for the analysts’ forecast model are presented in Panel A and the 
results for the naïve model in Panel B. 
Insert Table 6 here 
In the regression models based on analysts’ forecast surprise, the coefficients for cash flow 
surprise are significant at the ten percent level over a seven-day announcement period, 
(weakly) confirming H4 that cash flow disclosure contributes to resolving belief asymmetry. 
This finding is consistent with the results of the volume-based analysis, where it was shown 
that cash flows are significant in explaining the abnormal trading volume over both the three- 
and seven-day window in that model. The finding that the market response to earnings over a 
three-day window is not significant in the belief-asymmetry model could suggest that the 
immediate volume response is more closely related to factors other than the change in belief 
asymmetry. For instance, abnormal trading volume may be generated partly based on share 
price changes, which normally adjust to new information very quickly (e.g. Morse, 1978). 
Individual investors, however, may require some time to obtain the information and translate 
it into a trading decision if the disclosure alters their expectations.  
The regression analysis based on the naïve model, on the other hand, shows that cash flows 
are significant in resolving belief asymmetry over both time windows, even though the 
significance level is lower for the three-day window (p < .1 compared to p < .05). 
In contrast, accruals information does not appear to contribute to resolving belief asymmetry 
(H5). After including controls, there is a weakly significant relationship using the naïve 
expections model and a seven-day window. However, using the analysts’ forecast model, we 
find no such relationship. 
Volume response regressed on earnings surprise components and price reaction 
In the model we isolate the effect of cash flow and accrual disclosure on belief asymmetry by 
including abnormal return as an independent variable in a regression explaining volume 
response. We draw conclusions about effects on changes in belief asymmetry by examining 
the interactions between the surprise measures and abnormal returns. A significant 
relationship between an interaction term and the volume response would be indicative of a 
relationship between the surprise measure and changes in belief asymmetry. Table 7 reports 
the results. 
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Insert Table 7 here 
In the analysts’ forecast based regression model, cash flow and accrual surprise are significant 
at the five or ten percent level. While the coefficient on accrual surprise is close to zero, the 
positive coefficient on cash flow surprise implies that cash flow information may generate 
trading volume beyond that motivated by price changes.  
As we expect, abnormal returns are highly significant in explaining abnormal trading volume 
(three-day: t = 12.370; p < .05 and seven-day: t = 8.930; p < .01) [Table 7, Panel A], 
confirming that much of the trading volume surrounding the announcement day is motivated 
by the change in price. 
We obtain similar results in the regression analysis based on the naïve expectation model 
[Table 7, Panel B]. Both unexpected cash flows and unexpected return are significant at the 
one percent level across the three- and the seven-day window. Taken together these results 
provide strong support that cash flow disclosure significantly affects the level of belief 
asymmetry following the earnings announcement. 
The effects on belief asymmetry change are measured by the coefficients on the interaction 
terms. In the analysts’ forecast based models, the interaction between abnormal return and 
cash flow surprise and the interaction between abnormal return and accruals surprise are 
consistently significant for the three-day window, but not for the seven-day window. In the 
regressions based on the naïve expectation measures, the interaction variables are not 
significant at all. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we consider how the disclosure of cash flow and accrual components of 
earnings affects belief asymmetry among investors. We examine how surprise in these 
earnings components explains market response, using the framework developed by Kim and 
Verrecchia (1991). Their framework formalises the relationship between price response and 
volume response suggested by Beaver (1968). We add to the extant literature by considering 
trading volume and change in belief asymmetry as additional measures of market response to 
accounting information. Analysing market response in this way helps us to explain how, and 
to what extent, investors use  the information in the cash and accruals components of 
earnings.  This is an extension of earlier work which focuses on the value relevance of 
accounting information, where value relevance is assessed based on the price response to the 
information in earnings.   
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We hypothesise that the market response to the announced earnings, both in terms of volume 
and change in belief asymmetry, is driven more by the cash flow component of earnings 
surprise than by the accrual component. Using a sample of 1,244 firm-year observations from 
NYSE and AMEX, we first compare means of price and volume reactions across different 
levels of cash and accruals surprise. We then regress both market response measures against 
the components of earnings surprise and a set of control variables. 
The main findings can be summarised as follows. Firstly, cash flow disclosure is found to be 
significantly associated with the volume response following the earnings announcement. This 
result is consistent for different event windows and different proxies of market expectations 
and market surprise. Secondly, there is strong evidence that cash flows affect the level of 
belief asymmetry among investors. It appears that different investors respond differently to 
the same set of information. Finally, no evidence was found that the disclosure of accruals is 
associated with volume reaction of change in belief asymmetry.   
Our findings may provide policy makers with additional insights into how accounting data 
impacts the market in a broader sense than has been considered in the past. Rather than 
focusing on the first moment of the distribution of investors’ beliefs, as typically done in 
extant research, our approach considers the impact on trading activity in a general sense. We 
conclude that the overall market level of belief asymmetry may change as a result of 
accounting disclosures, even though this may not be reflected in returns.  Our evidence that 
announcements of the cash component of earnings leads to change in belief asymmetry 
provides a starting point for researchers interested in using our approach to examine other 
accounting issues such as the disclosure of the components of cash from operations.   
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the regression variables. 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness 25 Percentile 75 Percentile 
CAR3 1,244 0.038 0.028 0.038 2.697 0.012 0.050 
CAR7 1,244 0.052 0.039 0.053 3.537 0.018 0.069 
VOL3 1,231 0.507 0.276 0.708 3.765 0.090 0.640 
VOL7 1,231 0.374 0.203 0.513 3.892 0.072 0.474 
CFS 1,244 28.584 11.157 65.923 6.746 3.717 28.209 
ACS 1,244 119.844 25.688 393.101 6.773 8.243 71.404 
∆CF 809 40.131 19.633 67.184 4.215 8.350 41.239 
∆AC 809 70.529 25.668 146.502 4.471 11.330 62.993 
FSIZE 1,244 8.686 8.665 1.579 0.008 7.716 9.766 
LEV 1,244 1.779 1.284 28.719 -6.109 0.833 2.146 
ANA 1,244 5.394 3.000 5.274 2.179 2.000 7.000 
EQ 1,218 2.747 0.962 12.466 16.997 0.443 2.031 
AQ 1,217 0.938 1.000 0.242 -3.621 1.000 1.000 
RANGE 1,242 0.733 0.251 15.306 25.890 0.108 0.521 
DISP 1244 10.337 7.786 65.831 -20.673 3.808 16.736 
 
CAR3 =  3-day cumulative abnormal return 
CAR7 =  7-day cumulative abnormal return 
VOL3 =  3-day abnormal trading volume is the average change in volume traded over a 3-day period relative to the 180-day median 
daily trading volume (measured as the percentage of outstanding shares) 
VOL7 =  7-day abnormal trading volume is the average change in volume traded over a 7-day period relative to the 180-day median 
daily trading volume (measured as the percentage of outstanding shares) 
CFS =  Cash flow surprise is the relative difference between analysts’ consensus cash flow forecast and actual cash flows (in %) 
ACS =  Accruals surprise is the relative difference between the implied accruals forecast and implied actual accruals (in %) 
∆CF =  Cash flow surprise is the relative difference between current and previous period net cash flows from operations (in %) 
∆AC =  Accruals surprise calculated as the difference between implied current period accruals and implied previous period accruals  
 (in %) 
FSIZE =  Firm size proxied by (the natural logarithm of) the firm's total assets 
LEV =  Leverage calculated as total liabilities divided by total equity 
ANA =  Number of different analysts issuing cash flow forecasts per firm 
EQ =  Earnings quality is proxied by the ratio of cash flows from operations to net income 
AQ =  Audit quality dummy – 1 if audited by a Big5 firm, 0 if otherwise 
RANGE = Range of analysts’ forecasts calculated as difference between the highest and the lowest cash flow forecast per firm within the 
40-day period 
DISP =  Dispersion of analysts’ forecasts calculated as standard deviation of cash flow forecasts issued in the 40-day period prior to the 
earnings announcement 
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Table 2: Correlations  
This table reports Pearson and Spearman correlations for variables in the models. 
 CAR3 CAR7 VOL3 VOL7 CFS ACS ∆CF ∆AC 
CAR3  0.74607 0.38395 0.33512 0.13290 0.02262 0.16803 0.01657 
Sig.  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4254 0.0000 0.6380 
N  1244 1231 1231 1244 1244 809 809 
CAR7 0.61474  0.25902 0.33986 0.12773 -0.00769 0.16341 0.01735 
Sig. 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7865 0.0000 0.6222 
N 1244  1231 1231 1244 1244 809 809 
VOL3 0.31953 0.21326  0.85024 0.13842 0.02870 0.10109 -0.00270 
Sig. 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.3144 0.0040 0.9389 
N 1231 1231  1231 1231 1231 808 808 
VOL7 0.28287 0.25898 0.88835  0.11841 0.00408 0.13623 0.00114 
Sig. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.8862 0.0001 0.9743 
N 1231 1231 1231  1231 1231 808 808 
CFS 0.14463 0.09406 0.13048 0.09995  0.39908 0.18994 0.17443 
Sig. 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0004  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 1244 1244 1231 1231  1244 809 809 
ACS 0.11587 0.04205 0.14031 0.10146 0.80318  0.12233 0.16464 
Sig. 0.0000 0.1383 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000  0.0005 0.0000 
N 1244 1244 1231 1231 1244  809 809 
∆CF 0.10093 0.11592 0.07345 0.12492 0.16601 0.11597  0.39070 
Sig. 0.0041 0.0010 0.0369 0.0004 0.0000 0.0010  0.0000 
N 809 809 808 808 809 809  807 
∆AC 0.05350 0.08227 0.02800 0.03028 0.20341 0.25765 0.48512  
Sig. 0.1284 0.0193 0.4266 0.3901 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
N 809 809 808 808 809 809 807  
FSIZE -0.12960 -0.18104 -0.05239 -0.12227 0.07545 0.12825 -0.15299 -0.01702 
Sig. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0662 0.0000 0.0078 0.0000 0.0000 0.6288 
N 1244 1244 1231 1231 1244 1244 809 809 
LEV -0.10508 -0.11660 -0.06656 -0.08227 0.12401 0.07378 -0.12353 -0.04472 
Sig. 0.0002 0.0000 0.0195 0.0039 0.0000 0.0092 0.0004 0.2039 
N 1244 1244 1231 1231 1244 1244 809 809 
ANA -0.03644 0.02912 -0.13238 -0.08202 -0.28119 -0.35449 0.11230 0.00477 
Sig. 0.1990 0.3048 0.0000 0.0040 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014 0.8923 
N 1244 1244 1231 1231 1244 1244 809 809 
EQ 0.04445 0.08511 -0.14674 -0.11997 0.04473 -0.20897 0.08076 -0.05710 
Sig. 0.1210 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.1187 0.0000 0.0229 0.1081 
N 1218 1218 1205 1205 1218 1218 793 793 
AQ -0.03588 -0.04888 0.07173 0.04638 0.06788 0.08825 -0.01169 -0.03216 
Sig. 0.2110 0.0883 0.0128 0.1077 0.0179 0.0021 0.7414 0.3639 
N 1217 1217 1204 1204 1217 1217 799 799 
RANGE 0.03957 0.02647 -0.00009 -0.02276 0.19487 0.17941 -0.00614 0.03193 
Sig. 0.1634 0.3513 0.9975 0.4254 0.0000 0.0000 0.8618 0.3647 
N 1242 1242 1229 1229 1242 1242 808 808 
DISP 0.08592 0.03504 0.06292 0.02286 0.30148 0.28194 -0.01681 0.06282 
Sig. 0.0024 0.2168 0.0273 0.4229 0.0000 0.0000 0.6331 0.0741 
N 1244 1244 1231 1231 1244 1244 809 809 
Pearson correlations are presented above the diagonal and Spearman correlations below the diagonal.  Significance 
levels are based on a one-tailed significance test.  Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. 
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Table 2: Correlations (cont.) 
 FSIZE LEV ANA EQ AUDIT RAN40 DSP40 
CAR3 -0.1303 0.0550 -0.0348 0.0182 -0.0627 -0.0136 -0.0046 
Sig. 0.0000 0.0526 0.2200 0.5258 0.0286 0.6326 0.8716 
N 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,218 1,217 1,242 1,244 
CAR3 -0.18279 0.04484 -0.01551 0.02198 -0.07817 -0.01815 -0.02637 
Sig. 0.0000 0.1139 0.5846 0.4433 0.0064 0.5228 0.3527 
N 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,218 1,217 1,242 1,244 
VOL3 -0.07272 0.12222 -0.10612 0.02215 0.05805 -0.02070 0.00661 
Sig. 0.0107 0.0000 0.0002 0.4424 0.0440 0.4684 0.8167 
N 1,231 1,231 1,231 1,205 1,204 1,229 1,231 
VOL7 -0.13243 0.08140 -0.06239 0.01912 0.03164 -0.01847 0.00484 
Sig. 0.0000 0.0043 0.0286 0.5073 0.2727 0.5177 0.8654 
N 1,231 1,231 1,231 1,205 1,204 1,229 1,231 
CFS 0.12831 0.06387 -0.13748 0.03729 0.04837 -0.00404 -0.02408 
Sig. 0.0000 0.0243 0.0000 0.1934 0.0917 0.8869 0.3961 
N 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,218 1,217 1,242 1,244 
ACS 0.12095 0.02645 -0.13067 0.00707 0.04693 0.02375 0.01391 
Sig. 0.0000 0.3513 0.0000 0.8054 0.1017 0.4030 0.6241 
N 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,218 1,217 1,242 1,244 
∆CF -0.13452 0.00077 0.02206 0.00207 -0.01128 -0.02106 -0.00515 
Sig. 0.0001 0.9826 0.5310 0.9536 0.7502 0.5500 0.8837 
N 809 809 809 793 799 808 809 
∆AC -0.06178 0.00857 0.03794 -0.01609 -0.01086 -0.00410 0.01854 
Sig. 0.0790 0.8077 0.2811 0.6509 0.7593 0.9073 0.5986 
N 809 809 809 793 799 808 809 
FSIZE  0.04603 -0.00505 -0.02842 0.18570 0.00006 0.00925 
Sig.  0.1046 0.8589 0.3217 0.0000 0.9982 0.7444 
N  1,244 1,244 1,218 1,217 1,242 1,244 
LEV 0.40146  -0.01020 0.00443 -0.00115 -0.00970 -0.03553 
Sig. 0.0000  0.7193 0.8773 0.9679 0.7327 0.2105 
N 1,244  1,244 1,218 1,217 1,242 1,244 
ANA -0.12706 -0.19256  0.02734 -0.04487 -0.01358 0.00768 
Sig. 0.0000 0.0000  0.3405 0.1177 0.6326 0.7867 
N 1,244 1,244  1,218 1,217 1,242 1,244 
EQ -0.08639 0.18247 0.10726  0.00010 -0.00106 0.00974 
Sig. 0.0025 0.0000 0.0002  0.9973 0.9705 0.7342 
N 1,218 1,218 1,218  1,200 1,216 1,218 
AQ 0.19381 0.01831 -0.07352 -0.11433  0.00722 0.00323 
Sig. 0.0000 0.5234 0.0103 0.0001  0.8014 0.9104 
N 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,200  1,215 1,217 
RANGE 0.04079 -0.03290 0.23593 0.00851 0.03882  0.01288 
Sig. 0.1508 0.2466 0.0000 0.7668 0.1762  0.6502 
N 1242 1242 1242 1216 1215  1242 
DISP 0.06136 0.02208 0.02090 -0.01745 0.05380 0.79557  
Sig. 0.0304 0.4366 0.4614 0.5429 0.0606 0.0000  
N 1244 1244 1244 1218 1217 1242  
Pearson correlations are presented above the diagonal and Spearman correlations below the diagonal. 
Significance levels are based on a one-tailed significance test.  Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. 
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Table 3: Mean comparison of volume and price response  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for (i) the analysts’ forecast surprise model and (ii) the naïve expectations 
model 
This panel reports results for the comparison of means for the price and volume response after classifying each 
firm-year observation based on the magnitude of cash flow and accrual surprise. 
   








model   
P=0.0316 P=0.0463   P=0.0317 P=0.0416 
V=0.4179 V=0.5227  ∆AC – V=0.4526 V=0.5737 ACS – 
N=517 N=105    N=356 N=152  
 P=0.0388 P=0.0429    P=0.0316 P=0.0408 
V=0.4376 V=0.6077  ∆AC + V=0.5099 V=0.5538 ACS + 
N=105 N=517   N=151 N=353 
For each firm observation, the absolute values of cash flow surprise and accruals surprise are ranked as high or low relative to the measures’ 
median values and grouped according to the surprise combination. CFS- describes absolute cash flow surprise per share (based on the 40-day 
analysts’ consensus forecast) below and CFS+ absolute cash flow surprise above the sample’s median cash flow surprise per share. ACS- and 
ACS+ are defined as the absolute accruals surprise below and above the sample’s median accruals respectively. The descriptive statistics 
provide the absolute mean price response (P), the absolute mean volume response (V) and the number of observations (N) for each group. 
Panel B: Results of group ANOVA and tests of homogeneity 
This panel reports the results from a one-way ANOVA analysis of the differences reported in Panel A.  
 Sum of squares df Mean square ANOVA (F) Sig. Levene statistic Sig. 
(i) Analysts' forecasts surprise      
CAR3 0.04 3 0.013 9.488 0.000 9.818 0.000 
VOL3 9.764 3 0.001 6.586 0.000 6.279 0.000 
(ii) Naïve expectation       
CAR3 0.022 3 5.448 5.448 0.001 5.096 0.002 
VOL3 2.447 3 1.73 1.730 0.159 1.612 0.185 
CAR3 = unsigned cumulative abnormal return over the three-day announcement period 
VOL3 = unsigned abnormal trading volume over the three-day announcement period 
Panel C: Absolute mean differences for (i) the analysts’ forecast surprise model and (ii) the naïve model 
 







ACS +  














- 0.00002 0.00993 0.00918* 
CFS – 
ACS + 




0.05729 - 0.00995 0.00919* 
CFS + 
ACS – 




0.12114 0.06385 - 0.00075 
CFS + 
ACS + 




0.10125 0.04396 0.01989 - 
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. Absolute return mean differences (∆P) are reported above and absolute volume mean 
differences (∆V) are reported below the diagonal. 
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Table 4: OLS regression of abnormal volume on earnings surprise components 
Table 4 presents the results of the regression models with respect to volume-based market 
response. Analyses of the regression models based on analysts’ forecast surprise [M1(a) and (b), 
Panel A] precede those based on the naïve expectation model [M2(a) and (b), Panel B].  
Panel A: Analysts’ forecast model 
M1(a) M1(b) Independent 



























































R2 2.0% 1.6% 5.5% 5.0% 











Panel B: Naïve model 
M2(a) M2(b) Independent 













































R2 0.8% 1.5% 5.9% 5.4% 












*** Significant at 0.01 ** Significant at 0.05 * Significant at 0.10. T-values are shown in parentheses. 
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CFS=cash flow surprise  ACS=accruals surprise  ∆CF=unexpected cash flows  ∆AC=unexpected 
accruals FSIZE=firm size  LEV=leverage  ANA=analyst following  EQ=earnings quality  AQ=audit 
quality  DISP=variance of analysts’ forecasts  RANGE=range of analysts’ forecasts 
Table 5: OLS regression of volume-to-price-response ratio on earnings surprise components 
(VoP) 
This table reports the OLS regression results where the dependent variable is the ratio of abnormal 
trading volume to abnormal return.  Panel A summarises the results for tests based on the analysts’ 
forecasts surprise model and Panel B for those based on the naïve expectation model. 
Panel A: Analysts’ forecast model 
M3(a) M3(b) Independent 



























































R2 0.2% 0.2% 1.3% 1.0% 











Panel B: Naïve model 
M4(a) M4(b) Independent 













































R2 0.3% 0.1% 1.6% 1.3% 











*** Significant at 0.01 ** Significant at 0.05 * Significant at 0.10. T-values are shown in parentheses. 
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CFS=cash  flow surprise  ACS=accruals surprise  ∆CF=unexpected cash flows  ∆AC=unexpected 
accruals FSIZE=firm size  LEV=leverage  ANA=analyst following  EQ=earnings quality  AQ=audit 
quality  DISP=variance of analysts’ forecasts  RANGE=range of analysts’ forecasts 
Table 6: OLS regression of the volume-price response difference on earnings components 
(VminP) 
This table reports the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the difference between the 
standardised abnormal trading volume and the standardised abnormal return using both a 3-day and 7-day window. 
Results for the analysts’ forecast model are presented in Panel A and the results for the naïve model in Panel B. 
Panel A: Analysts’ forecast model 
M5(a) M5(b) Independent 



























































R2 0.1% 0.4% 3.0% 1.9% 











Panel B: Naïve model 
M6(a) M6(b) Independent 













































R2 0.4% 0.7% 4.1% 4.8% 











*** Significant at 0.01 ** Significant at 0.05 * Significant at 0.10. T-values are shown in parentheses. 
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CFS=cash  flow surprise  ACS=accruals surprise  ∆CF=unexpected cash flows  ∆AC=unexpected 
accruals FSIZE=firm size  LEV=leverage  ANA=analyst following  EQ=earnings quality  AQ=audit 
quality  DISP=variance of analysts’ forecasts  RANGE=range of analysts’ forecast 
Table 7: Volume response regressed on earnings surprise components and price reaction 
This table reports the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is abnormal trading volume over 
a 3 and 7 day window.  Results where cash flow and accrual surprise is measured using the analysts’ forecast 
(naïve) model are presented in Panel A (B). 
Panel A: Analysts’ forecast model 
M7(a) M7(b) Independent  








































































R2 16.6% 12.3% 19.3% 14.3% 











*** Significant at 0.01 ** Significant at 0.05 * Significant at 0.10. T-values are shown in parentheses. 
CFS=cash flow surprise  ACS=accruals surprise accruals  FSIZE=firm size  LEV=leverage  
ANA=analyst following  EQ=earnings quality  AQ=audit quality  DISP=variance of analysts’ 
forecasts  RANGE=range of analysts’ forecast 
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Table 7.: Volume response regressed on earnings surprise components and price reaction (cont.) 
Panel B: Naïve model 
M8(a) M8(b) Independent  








































































R2 19.2% 18.6% 23.0% 20.5% 











*** Significant at 0.01 ** Significant at 0.05 * Significant at 0.10. T-values are shown in parentheses. 
∆CF=unexpected cash flows  ∆AC=unexpected accruals  FSIZE=firm size  LEV=leverage  
ANA=analyst following  EQ=earnings quality  AQ=audit quality  DISP=dispersion  RANGE=range 
 
 
